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During the Japanese rule, many Korean leaders escaped from the Korean peninsula and settled in China and Manchuria. They established a government in exile in China and resisted Japan to get independence. As Communism influenced Asian elites, during WWII Korean leaders in China were separated into two groups, Communist and Nationalist/Capitalist. They did not like but supported each other to fight against Japan. As the Japanese power became weaker, hatred between the two Korean groups was expressed more often and the gap between them became wider.
While the western Allied countries were struggling with defeating Germany and Japan, the Soviets were supporting communists in Asia. Korean communist leaders had become stronger by the time Japan surrendered to America. Korea's separation was already inherent in the division between Korean Communist and Nationalist/Capitalist leaders. Acheson stressed the importance of defending Japan at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950 , and South Korea was left outside the chain of states to be protected. The U.S. intervened in the Korean War and had to sacrifice more than 137,000 young American casualties for three years to get only partial success. 3 Korea is still divided between North and South, and the division still causes instability in North East Asia and incurs a high cost for managing the instability.
The purpose of this paper is not to blame the U.S. leadership for the division of Korea but to recognize that the division has caused threats, conflicts, high costs and instability in this region. The purpose of this paper is to analyze U.S. policy in the region, and it concludes that a better option would be to support the reunification of Korea under South Korea's control.
The U.S. has three national security goals: enhancing security at home and abroad; promoting prosperity; and promoting democracy and human rights. 4 Japan annexed Korea successfully and became strong enough to win wars against China and Russia. Then, Japan dared to attack Pearl Harbor, thus initiating the Pacific War. The
United States main theater of war was in Europe, and the U.S. had to suffer defeats by the Japanese in the early engagements such as the Philippines. The U.S. military also had to pay sacrifices to defeat the Japanese military and occupy islands across the Pacific. As Japanese defenders on the islands chose to die rather than surrender, the U.S. strategic leaders anticipated it would require severe casualties trying to land on the Japanese homeland. The U.S. wanted the Soviet Union to intervene in the Pacific war from Siberia to fix the Japanese strong army in Manchuria, even though the U.S. leadership recognized that this would put Russia in a strong post-war position in North East Asia.
The U.S. later made an important decision against the plan to invade the Japanese homeland, and instead decided to use a new technology to destroy the Japanese will to fight.
On August 6"and 9, 1945, the U.S. Air Force dropped two atomic bombs on two industrial cities in Japan. The use of two atomic bombs gave the United States great advantage and permanently broke Japan's will to fight. The Japanese were hurt and dishonored because they were the first and only target for the atomic bomb, and this emotion would never be erased.
Japan realized that the new bomb's destruction capability was too great, and surrendered on the day after the second atomic bombing. Two days after the U.S. first nuclear attack, the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war and sent several divisions of Russian troops rapidly through Manchuria to Korea, defeating the weakened Japanese troops. 10 The United States did not yet see that the Korean peninsula was important to its own national interests. The U.S. primary national interest in North East Asia was a secure Japan.
The Soviet Union, however, already recognized the strategic value of the Korean peninsula. This perspective gap between Korean political leaders and the Americans made it difficult for the American military government to stabilize Korea as an independent, united, and democratic country. Conversely, the Soviets were supporting Korean communists to establish a government in the north portion of Korea, and were already fortifying the 3 8 t parallel in 1945.
Because the Soviets had to cope with human and material destruction at home in 1945/46 they had neither the resources nor the will to create a full satellite state in Korea. However, the Soviets suplrorted Kim II Sung's formation of a government which had a degree of autonomy in North Korea, greater than that allowed to several eastern European states. 4 Kim II Sung, with Soviet support, could build a stronger military than could South Korea, as is shown in Table 1 below.
While the Soviet Union was helping Kim II Sung build a communist country in the north, the United States military government was struggling with Korean Rightists because of different perspectives and misunderstandings between the two sides. Even after the South Koreans established a legitimate government under UN observation, the U.S. and the new Republic of Korea (ROK) government had difficulties trying to improve South Korea's economic, political, social, and military conditions. It seemed that the Soviets had no settled policy for the unification of Korea as a communist country until the Chinese Communists swept the Chinese Nationalists from northeastern China in 1948-1949. According to a CIA report in 1947, the Soviet policy in Korea was directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which would never serve as a base of attack upon the USSR. In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost to its own scanty resources in the Far East, the USSR had attempted to make North Korea economically selfsufficient, though politically subordinate. The same report also argued that Soviet long-term goals to integrate the entire Korean peninsula in the Soviet defense system were a questionable assertion. 15 As long as the Chinese Nationalists were occupying much of Manchuria, Kim II Sung also had to defend North Korea from being squeezed by South Korea and the Chinese Nationalists.
Classification
North The Chinese Communists' victory in China dramatically changed North Korea's situation, and also raised the ante for the Soviets. The North Korean and Soviet strategic objective then became clear: to unify the Korean peninsula under the communist government by force.
Meanwhile, the U.S. took several steps to abandon South Korea and remove the Korean peninsula from its national interests.
Since Japan surrendered in 1945, the U.S. policy on Korea had seemed to be to make
Korea not only independent and united, but also democratic; however, American leaders had made no single, well-calculated decision about the strategic value of Korea to U.S. interests in the region. A country, to deter any aggression, should threaten to impose greater losses on an opponent than the opponent can hope to gain by attacking. The United States, however, never made a conclusive decision to defend Korea, nor did it make a credible military threat against North Korea or the Soviets. Instead, the United States began to withdraw its troops from South Korea in the fall of 1947.
The U.S. turned South Korea over to the UN to minimize South Korea's vulnerability and tried to redeem its commitment to South Korea by providing enough military aid (it was not enough, though, as seen in Table 1 ) to enable South Korea to defend itself, but they would not commit to defend South Korea in the future. A widely publicized speech on Asia policy by U.S. There were also certain individuals in the American administration who began to press for an American commitment to cross the 3 8 th parallel in pursuit of reunification once the United The current U.S. national security policy in North East Asia stated in the latest version of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), 'A National Security Strategy For A Global Age,' has several problems: it is an unclear policy on an important issue; it has a wrong central concept;
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and it is not integrated. The NSS states that U.S. regional policies reflect overall strategy and guiding principles, but must be tailored to the unique challenges and opportunities of each region. According to the NSS, the U.S. regional policy in East Asia is to promote democracy and human rights, to advance economic integration and rules-based trade, and to enhance security in this region.28
These statements are too general and are unclear as to whether the U.S. policy pursues Korea's reunification under South Korea's control or prefers the status quo in order to enhance security in the region.
On page 49, under the "Korean Peninsula" paragraph, the NSS also states that peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance peace and security in the East Asian region and is clearly in the U.S. strategic interest. 29 This statement has a quite clear stance on the Korean issue; however, it looks like a rhetoric statement because under the "Japan" paragraph on the same page, the NSS states that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and maintaining a peaceful and prosperous environment for the Asia Pacific region. 30 As long as the Japanese policy requires the status quo on the Korean peninsula, these two statements are incompatible.
By stating that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is central to achieve strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. policy in the region has a wrong central axis. A central axis, like a center of gravity, is critical for finding solutions in a complicated situation where each country has its own interests and those interests conflict with each other. The U.S.-Japan security alliance would be more important for the U.S. policy than many other issues; however, it is not the central axis to ensure stability in the region. Without a realistic stance on the Korea's reunification and an understanding of the correct central axis in the region, the U.S. cannot integrate policies on China, Japan, Korea, and Far East Russia. Rather, the respective policies will be piecemeal and unsynchronized.
The ROK-US alliance should be the central axis for the U.S. policy in North East Asia.
There are several reasons for this. First, as we already studied in the previous paragraphs, The ultimate goal of the U.S. support toward South Korea is to build South Korea as a strategic companion. Peaceful unification can only be accomplished by South Korea that is much stronger than North Korea in terms of politics, economy, and military because the unification process is the competition of powers. Because the unification issue is not the unification process itself, but the preparation for the unification, South Korea must develop politically (a mature democracy), economically (sound free market system), and militarily (a "small but strong" and balanced armed forces) in order to accomplish peaceful unification with and integrate North Korea. The political, economical, and military support from the U.S. is critical for South Korea to become an advanced country which has enough strength to accomplish peaceful unification with North Korea.
The other reason that South Korea should have enough national power is related to the U.S. interests regarding a desirable world order in the region, which are regional stability and no regional hegemonic power. A strong unified Korea could contribute to peace and stability by maintaining a balance of power with China and Japan.
The Americans appear to think that they can control Japan effectively through the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. However, Americans seem to ignore lessons learned from recent history. Did Americans anticipate that Japan would defeat China and Russia? Did Americans anticipate that Japan would attack the Pearl Harbor? Almost everyone in the U.S. military looks at China as a potential peer competitor and ignores the possibility of Japanese expansion.
Americans probably think that Japan would not provoke war again because Japanese remember that they were the first and last targets of atomic bombs. However, on the contrary, Asians are concerned that Japan might try to become a regional power again and retaliate by challenging America when it gets enough power. Japan has two clear strategic reasons to do so: survival and a sense of national honor.
If either China or Japan is a potential regional hegemonic power, the efficient way to prevent two countries from being a hegemonic power in the region is to build another strong country so that three countries stay in balance and stability. If a caldron has only two legs, it is not able to stand safely and will fall down if influenced by a small variable. However, if it has three legs, it can stand long and safe. As a caldron with three legs is stable, a unified Korea, Japan, and China could accomplish stability and peace even if there were to be small conflicts between the three nations. Korea is successful through opening and reform, or the regime collapses, the ROK and the U.S.
would have more opportunities than challenges, if both countries manage the risks studied in the previous section.
In addition to supporting the two directions, it is necessary for the U.S. to state clearly its support for South Korea's peaceful reunification policy in its National Security Strategy. Clear U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula could lead other countries in the region to understand the U.S. interests in the region are stability, peace, and regional economic development rather than competition, containment, or confrontation.
ADVANTAGES Third, the U.5. could develop a greater market in China, ensuring the flow of cheap and qualified products from China to America. Fourth, as threats from North Korea disappear, the cost for managing security and the total cost for US forces in the region would be reduced.
Fifth, the US could have flexibility for its China policy by having Taiwan, Japan, and unified Korea as its "cards" while China loses the "North Korea card". Sixth, the USFK could solve current challenges such as shortages of training sites, Koreans' reduced support of the US presence, and budget limitations, and could continue to have a significant role for the security of North East Asia. The value of USFK's continued presence could be explained in consideration of the unified Korea's military strength.
A unified Korea could develop three options for the armed forces structure as shown in Table 6 below. The minimum structure is about the same size as the current Japanese Self Defense Force. This option requires support from allied countries to deter bigger threats. The medium structure could achieve the current ROK military transformation goal of "small but strong armed forces". This option also requires support from allied countries to cope with a major threat. The self-reliant structure could manage any conventional conflicts independently.
However, because this option should not have a strategic deterrence capability, it also requires support from allied countries to manage this kind of threat. Therefore, whatever option the Japanese obstruction of the reunification policy, and political and economical conflicts between the U.S. and Japan caused from it, are additional serious risks for the U.S. interests in the region. However, the U.S. should not repeat the historical strategic mistake of the TaftKatsura secret agreement which allowed Japan to get the Korean peninsula and dominate the region. 3 5 As long as North Korea's WMD capability, long-range missiles and conventional military capabilities are posing threats to Japan, and as long as a reunified Korea constructs strong alliances with the U.S. and Japan, there are no reasons for Japan to prefer the status quo to reunification. Therefore, any strong Japanese opposition to the reunification policy could be indicative of a desire to expand its influence in the region.
CONCLUSION
It has been a little more than fifty years since Korea was separated into the south and north in 1945. The separation partly resulted from the U.S. misunderstanding of Korea's strategic value in the region. This division has posed threats, instability, and high cost to the world even after the former Soviet Union collapsed. As long as the confrontation between North Korea and South Korea, both of which have significant military capabilities, continues, the U.S.
interest in the region is at stake. However, the U.S. policy in the region, especially related to the Korea's reunification, has been unclear whether it prefers the status quo to reunification, or the reverse.
If reunification on the Korean peninsula under South Korea's control is accomplished, the U.S. interests in the region would be attained: North Korea's threats with conventional military, WMD, and long-range missiles capabilities would be removed, and a reunified Korea with the USFK reinforcement could maintain the balance of power with neighboring countries. Because there are risks of North Korea's provocation and neighboring countries' confrontation during the process of reunification, any military options must be avoided and the process should be a peaceful one. The U.S. should support South Korea to accomplish peaceful reunification under its control.
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How does the U.S. support South Korea's reunification? As long as the reunification process is a power struggle and the reunification issue is not the process itself but the preparation for reunification, the U.S. must first help South Korea develop a healthy democracy, sound economic free market system, and a balanced and small but strong enough military. 
